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Originalism and the Executive  
N E I L  K I N K O P F   
Review of Saikrishna Prakash, Imperial from the Beginning: The              
Constitution of the Original Executive  (Yale, 2015) 		
Professor Saikrishna Prakash is one of 
the most talented and accomplished 
scholars of the presidency.  He has done 
landmark work advancing the unitary 
executive theory of presidential power, 
co-authoring what remains the leading 
law review article on the subject while 
still a law clerk.  So his new book, Imperi-
al from the Beginning:  The Constitution of the 
Original Executive, commands the atten-
tion of anyone interested in the Ameri-
can presidency.   
 
The book is stubbornly committed to 
presenting a picture of the powers of the 
presidential office as those powers were 
understood to exist during the founding 
era (when the Constitution was ratified 
and in the years shortly following), with 
particular attention to the administration 
of George Washington.  Discussion of 
the powers of the original executive has 
obvious implications for current conflicts 
over presidential power.  Obvious as the-
se implications may be, however, the 
book steadfastly—and puzzlingly—
refuses to draw or even consider them.  
Instead, Prakash trains his focus wholly 
on the presidency in the founding era.   
Anyone writing about presidential power 
will confront a decision:  whether to fo-
cus on the forest (examining presidential 
power generally), on the one hand, or 
the trees (considering specific issues of 
presidential power), on the other.  Faced 
with this choice, Prakash wisely heeds 
the advice of the late Yogi Berra – 
“When you come to a fork in the road, 
take it.”  The opening chapters of the 
book discuss the presidency in broad 
terms.  Its concluding chapters, the 
book’s strength, by contrast consider 
myriad specific issues of presidential 
power.   
 
In the end, this project turns out to be 
unworthy of Prakash’s remarkable tal-
ents.  Despite the book’s provocative ti-
tle, the big picture he presents of presi-
dential power turns out to be appropri-
ately nuanced.  So understood—
properly hedged and qualified—the 
book’s broad significance is elusive.  Yet 
the view of the trees, for its part, suffers 
from an unavoidable flaw:  there are so 
many issues of presidential power that 
none is, or really can be, treated with the 
depth it deserves.  Finally, the book is 
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rooted in a commitment to originalism 
as the proper method of constitutional 
interpretation, but ends up offering a 
case study of originalism’s flaws.  I elabo-
rate these criticisms in turn below. 
 
I.   The Forest of Presidential Power 
 
The book begins with a broad discussion 
of the nature of the presidency.  The 
purpose of this examination is to estab-
lish the man-bites-dog thesis expressed in 
the book’s title, viz., that the Presidency 
was originally understood as an imperial, 
even monarchical, office.  Professor Pra-
kash is a thoughtful and careful scholar.  
Too much so to actually maintain this 
sensational thesis.  The case he actually 
advances is that the presidency is mo-
narchical except where it isn’t, and the 
founding generation understood the 
presidency to be much more monar-
chical than present-day commentators 
suppose.  Thus reformulated, Prakash’s 
thesis is not quite so arresting as the 
book’s title would lead one to imagine— 
though it is still at odds with popular 
wisdom.  
 
Prakash manages to marshal an impres-
sive defense of his claim.  Many Ameri-
cans at the time of the founding in fact 
believed the Constitution created some-
thing like a monarchy.  “Clear-eyed for-
eigners” (Prakash’s term) could see the 
same thing.  Yet this shouldn’t strike us 
as so surprising.  After all, everyone un-
derstood that the President would be 
George Washington and most in the 
founding generation were willing to en-
trust extensive authority to him.   
 
While Prakash’s case is surprisingly 
strong, at least three doubts linger.  First, 
it was as common at the time of the 
founding as it is now for critics to use 
“imperial” and “monarchy” as epithets.  
And this turns up in many of the sources 
that Prakash cites as evidence of the na-
ture of the presidency at the founding.  
Second, George Washington himself was 
adamantly opposed to monarchy, as 
Prakash points out.  Third, and most 
significantly, the Constitution itself seems 
to expressly reject Prakash’s claim in the 
Guarantee Clause.  The Guarantee 
Clause imposes on Congress the duty to 
guarantee to each state a republican 
form of government.  It seems incongru-
ous for a document containing such a 
clause to establish a monarchy at the 
federal level.  Prakash urges that the 
term “republic” or “republican form of 
government” was imprecise at the time 
the Constitution was ratified.  Many re-
publics had monarchical elements and 
many monarchies had come to embrace 
republican elements, hence the mixed 
monarchies of eighteenth century Eu-
rope.  In our own time, the Supreme 
Court has identified the Guarantee 
Clause as raising nonjusticiable political 
questions because the meaning of a re-
publican form of government is not judi-
cially discernible.  Nonetheless, if repub-
lican means anything at all, it means no 
monarchy.   
 
Having said that, it may be that some 
powers exercised by monarchs are also 
exercised by leaders of republics. In fact, 
it would be surprising if this were not the 
case.  The real issue is not what label we 
apply to the leader.  The crux of the 
matter is what powers the leader has.  
This is the concern of the book’s remain-
ing, and much more consequential, 
chapters.    
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II. The Trees 
 
There are a great many specific contro-
versies relating to presidential power.  
Professor Prakash takes us on a guided 
tour of nearly every one.  He is a gifted 
and sure-footed guide.  One has the 
sense that he has read every conceivable 
founding era source on presidential 
power and he does a fine job curating 
those sources to determine which are 
worthy of our attention.  Prakash is an 
equally engaging guide.  A good guide 
cares about his subject and has views 
about it.  In this vein, Prakash is opin-
ionated and clearly expresses his views 
regarding the merits of each of the con-
troversies he examines.  It would be a 
dull slog indeed if he were to merely pre-
sent the controversies and leave open the 
matter of their resolution.   
 
Nonetheless, and inevitably, Professor 
Prakash’s conclusions are unpersuasive.  
I say inevitably because, given the great 
number of issues of presidential power 
the book canvases, it is impossible for 
Prakash to spend more than a few pages 
on any of them.  The conclusions he sets 
forth are argued cogently enough.  But 
they are presented so briefly that the 
reader is left with the sense that a full 
rehearsal of the arguments might lead 
one to a different conclusion.  Take the 
removal power, for example.  Contro-
versies relating to this authority are as 
old as the Constitution.  And the issue 
goes to the core of presidential power.  
More than any other presidential au-
thority, after all, it is the power to re-
move subordinates “at will” that allows 
the President to control the executive 
branch.  Indeed, agencies we today con-
sider to be independent agencies (The 
Federal Reserve, the FCC, the SEC, the 
FEC, etc.) are independent precisely be-
cause they are headed by individuals 
who may be removed only for cause.  
This means the officers who head the 
independent agencies cannot be re-
moved because of policy differences with 
the President.   
 
Prakash discusses the First Congress’s 
consideration of the removal question, 
resulting in the so-called Decision of 
1789.   Specifically, Congress debated 
the question whether the Constitution 
grants the President the power to re-
move subordinate officers, or if instead 
that power must be conferred by Con-
gress.  In the statute establishing the De-
partment of Foreign Affairs, Congress 
determined to recognize the President’s 
removal power over the head of that de-
partment in a manner that intentionally 
did not imply the power was statutory.  
In other words, the President’s authority 
to remove the officer we now call the 
Secretary of State exists not because 
Congress confers it, but because the 
Constitution confers it.   
 
Fair enough.  It does not necessarily fol-
low, however, that the same would be 
true of other officers.  Moreover, it does 
not obviously follow that Congress lacks 
authority to regulate the terms on which 
the President may exercise the constitu-
tionally-conferred removal power as a 
component of Congress’s authority to 
establish and define the offices and agen-
cies it creates.  These are difficult ques-
tions and the just-over two pages Pra-
kash devotes to them simply are not 
enough to convince anyone who isn’t 
already convinced of his conclusions.  It 
is nonetheless a lucid and engaging in-
troduction to the topic, as long as the 
reader is careful not to treat it as more 
than that.  
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These inquiries into specific issues of 
presidential power are less interesting in 
isolation than when considered together.  
The reason is that from them emerges a 
strikingly perverse picture of the presi-
dency.  Most of us consider the President 
to have greater authority and autonomy 
in the area of foreign and military affairs 
than in domestic matters, where Con-
gress’s powers are more significant.   The 
original presidency that Prakash recov-
ers, however, is one with vast authority 
in the domestic realm, but one with rela-
tively little independent power with re-
spect to foreign and military affairs.  For 
example, Presidents have frequently re-
lied on the Commander-in-Chief role to 
justify extensive unilateral military pow-
er.  Next to this model, the original un-
derstanding of the commander in chief 
will appear trifling.  Commander in 
Chief was a widely used title at the time 
the Constitution was adopted.  It re-
ferred to nothing more than the com-
mander of a military unit:  a captain was 
a commander in chief of a company and 
a colonel was a commander in chief of a 
regiment, etc.   
 
The upshot of these observations, in 
Prakash’s view, is that this title merely 
placed its holder in the chain of com-
mand; it conferred no authority to make 
any substantive decisions.  So, the Con-
stitution places the President at the head 
of the chain of command for all U.S. 
military forces, nothing more.  Congress, 
by contrast, holds the power to declare 
war and, significantly, the power to 
make rules for the government and regu-
lation of the military.  These are sweep-
ing powers, according to Prakash, that 
authorize Congress not only to deter-
mine whether to go to war, but to regu-
late the conduct of the war and even to 
dictate strategy.   
Moreover, Prakash argues, the allocation 
of authorities disables the President from 
deploying military force in any way that 
encroaches upon Congress’s power.  
Thus, the President may not order mili-
tary deployments that constitute a decla-
ration of war—which would cover virtu-
ally all offensive military deployments.  
Prakash does identify a few exceptional 
instances where military deployment 
does not represent a declaration of war, 
and thus may validly be ordered by the 
President without prior congressional 
authorization.  First, the President may 
deploy the military to repel sudden at-
tacks.  Second, the President may deploy 
the military to rescue American citizens.  
And the President may order offensive 
military force against pirates because 
action against criminals is not a declara-
tion of war.   
 
As with the removal power, the picture 
that Prakash paints of the commander-
in-chief power is controversial.  There 
are originalist scholars who regard the 
President as largely unfettered in his au-
thority to order the use of offensive mili-
tary force.  As with the removal power, 
Prakash’s brief discussion can hardly be 
taken as conclusive or even as ultimately 
persuasive, but again it is a fine introduc-
tion to the subject.  It also raises some 
obvious contemporary questions:  Does 
the power to repel attacks include the 
power to strike preemptively?   If we re-
gard groups such as al Qaeda and ISIL 
as criminal syndicates, is the President 
constitutionally authorized to strike 
them?  Does that power evaporate if the 
groups are more properly conceptualized 
as states or combatants?  These im-
portant and interesting questions fall 
outside the scope of the book. 
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III.   A Practical Suggestion 
 
In the book’s closing pages, Professor 
Prakash makes a few process-oriented 
prescriptions for presidents in exercising 
their duty to interpret the Constitution.  
This interpretive function is, in practice, 
performed by the Department of Jus-
tice’s Office of Legal Counsel.  Prakash 
urges that OLC be stripped of its “quasi-
monopoly” over determining the scope 
of the President’s constitutional power.  
Formally, OLC has no authority to bind 
the President.  Thus, the President re-
mains free to disagree with OLC’s con-
clusions and to pursue his own constitu-
tional interpretation.  Practically, how-
ever, this rarely occurs, which leads to 
the “quasi-monopoly” Prakash com-
plains of.   
 
While I could not disagree more strongly 
with his prescription, I will concede that 
Prakash offers a powerful reason for it.  
He wants to ensure an element of adver-
sariness.  I agree that it is crucial that 
constitutional interpretation be informed 
by the full range of arguments and that 
this is best accomplished when the op-
posing arguments are briefed by actual 
opponents.  If we think of the most 
shameful episode in OLC’s history—the 
infamous Torture Memo—we find this 
adversariness lacking.  The opposing 
views of the State Department were nev-
er sought by or introduced to OLC.  In-
deed, State appears to have been cut out 
of the decision-making loop entirely.  
But shifting the interpretive function 
from OLC back to the President will not 
redress this problem.  The President can 
just as easily cut an agency out of the 
decision-making process as can OLC.  In 
fact, the President can do so more easily, 
as access to the President is so tightly 
(and, in many cases, secretly) guarded by 
his staff.   
 
Prakash’s suggestion seems based on his 
supposition that a President would re-
ceive opinions from the contending 
agencies and choose the best legal argu-
ment, offering a publicly reasoned ex-
planation for his decision.  This would 
bring us back to a model that looks a bit 
like practice in the Washington Admin-
istration.  The most notable example is 
the controversy over the power of the 
federal government to charter the Bank 
of the United States.  President Wash-
ington received the affirmative opinion 
of Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamil-
ton (before he became a Broadway star) 
and the negative opinion of Secretary of 
State Thomas Jefferson, supported by a 
separate opinion from Attorney General 
Edmund Randolph.  Washington agreed 
with Hamilton in this instance, but never 
reduced his reasons to a written opinion.  
In any case, there is no reason to think 
that this is how the process would work 
today.  First, a President is unlikely to be 
familiar with constitutional law generally 
or the law of presidential power in par-
ticular, and so is unlikely to be equipped 
to perform this function personally.  
Even if a President were versed in this 
area of law, say because he taught Con-
stitutional Law at a leading American 
law school, we might still expect that a 
President would choose between com-
peting arguments based not on their 
merits but on the desired result.   
 
This appears to be precisely what hap-
pened when President Obama confront-
ed the question of whether the United 
States could continue to participate in 
enforcing a no-fly zone over Libya be-
yond the deadline set by the War Powers 
Act.  By all accounts, OLC and the De-
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fense Department opined that the Presi-
dent could not do so.  President Obama 
decided to accept the State Depart-
ment’s ludicrous argument that facilitat-
ing the enforcement of a no-fly zone 
through drone bombing did not repre-
sent “hostilities” for purposes of the War 
Powers Act.  President Obama, like Pres-
ident Washington before him, offered no 
opinion of his own on the matter as to 
the correct interpretation of law.   Nor is 
this a historically isolated incident.  Pres-
ident Jackson did the same thing when 
confronted with the question of whether 
he could withdraw funds from the Bank 
of the United States in order to put it out 
of business.  He fired his dissenting Sec-
retary of the Treasury and appointed a 
more compliant legal interpreter to the 
office (the future Chief Justice Roger 
Taney).   
 
I am not at all sure that President Wash-
ington did anything different with re-
spect to the Bank of the United States in 
his day.  It seems unlikely that he was 
simply convinced by that the arguments 
of Secretary Hamilton were stronger as a 
pure matter of law.  Rather, it may well 
be that he thought there were strong le-
gal arguments to be made on both sides 
and it was legally open to him to deter-
mine that, as a matter of policy, the 
Bank would be salutary.  Given all this, it 
seems fanciful to imagine that a Presi-
dent would engage in independent legal 
analysis. Rather, as the Obama and 
Jackson examples illustrate, we should 
expect Presidents to go opinion shop-
ping.  Prakash’s prescription, I fear, 
would seriously undermine the rule of 
law.  
 
 
 
 
IV. Originalism 
 
Prakash begins by dividing the universe 
into two camps:  originalists and living 
constitutionalists.  Originalists will care 
about his project for obvious reasons.  
They rely on the original meaning 
(though Prakash recognizes that this con-
struct has a variety of formulations) to 
determine constitutional interpretation.  
He does not, or prefers not to, fathom 
why living constitutionalists find the orig-
inal understanding interesting.  It is 
enough for him to note that even “pro-
ponents of a living Constitution … sup-
pose[] that the Constitution’s original 
meaning matters in some unusual way.”  
Unusual?  As a descriptive matter, this 
characterization is exactly backwards.  
Non-originalist methodologies have been 
the overwhelming norm throughout the 
history of American constitutionalism.  
Among Supreme Court justices, no more 
than a handful have espoused original-
ism as a consistent interpretive method-
ology (as opposed to deploying originalist 
arguments in the truly usual way:  as one 
of several legitimate sources of constitu-
tional meaning).   Perversely, the book 
ends up providing a good case against 
originalism as an interpretive method.   
 
The book begins by responding to a fa-
miliar critique of originalism – that the 
Constitution’s original meaning is inde-
terminate because the evidence is incon-
clusive.  As Justice Robert Jackson fa-
mously put it, “Just what our forefathers 
did envision, or would have envisioned 
had they foreseen modern conditions, 
must be divined from materials almost as 
enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was 
called upon to interpret for Pharaoh….  
[The materials] supply more or less apt 
quotations … on each side of any ques-
tion.  They largely cancel each other.”  
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Prakash thinks Justice Jackson too hasty 
in dismissing founding era materials, 
however.  In his view, even where the 
sources are not perfectly one-sided, they 
point quite strongly to an answer.  The 
real problem, as Prakash sees it, is that 
the originalist record is too voluminous.  
He cites Justice Scalia’s estimate that, if 
done right, examining the historic record 
for an answer to a particular question 
“might well take thirty years and 7,000 
pages.”  If that is true, Scalia and Pra-
kash have identified a literal embarrass-
ment of riches.  As Prakash himself 
points out, “[t]his life is too short to 
spend thirty years and 7,000 pages on a 
single question of presidential power.”   
Quite so.  Originalism is an unusable 
method of constitutional interpretation.  
Not a single justice in the history of the 
Supreme Court has managed to practice 
this approach.   
 
Practical concerns aside, why would we 
want the meaning of the Constitution to 
turn on something so inaccessible?  Con-
stitutional interpretation would become 
the sole province of a tiny elite of legal 
historians.  To put it in originalist terms, 
it strikes me as inconceivable that the 
founders would have ratified a Constitu-
tion that could not be interpreted by 
judges or by the President and Congress 
whose offices so obviously require them 
to put the Constitution into practice.  If 
this is true, the project of constitutional-
ism, to borrow from Justice Scalia, will 
have achieved terminal silliness. 
 
* * *  
 
Imperial from the Beginning is a useful 
guidebook.  It provides a catalog of con-
troversies regarding presidential power.  
It also collects an impressive array of 
sources for addressing those controver-
sies.  For these reasons, it should be an 
important resource for anyone confront-
ing issues of presidential power (which I 
hope will continue to include lawyers at 
the Office of Legal Counsel).  Anyone 
looking for resolution to these controver-
sies, however, will do well to go beyond 
this volume; they will not be resolved by 
reference, however scrupulous, to the 
founding presidency. 
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